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 Nietzsche holds that people lack freedom of the will in any sense that would be sufficient for 
ascriptions of moral responsibility; that the conscious experience we have of willing is actually 
epiphenomenal with respect to the actions that follow that experience; and that our actions largely arise 
through non-conscious processes (psychological and physiological) of which we are only dimly aware, 
and over which we exercise little or no conscious control.   At the same time, Nietzsche, always a master 
of rhetoric, engages in a “persuasive definition” (Stevenson 1938) of the language of “freedom” and 
“free will,” to associate the positive valence of these terms with a certain Nietzschean ideal of the 
person unrelated to traditional notions of free will. 
Denial of Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
 Nietzsche’s skepticism about freedom and responsibility is a pervasive theme throughout his 
corpus.    In a relatively early work, Daybreak,  he writes:  
Do I have to add that the wise Oedipus was right that we really are not responsible for our 
dreams—but just as little for our waking life, and that the doctrine of freedom of will has 
human pride and feeling of power for its father and mothers?  (D 128) 
Belief in freedom of the will is to be explained by the motivations we have for accepting it, not 
by its reality:  we are as little responsible for what we do in real life as what we do in our dreams.  
The same idea is sounded in one of his very last works: 
Formerly man was given a „free will‟ as his dowry from a higher order:  today we have 
taken his will away altogether, in the sense that we no longer admit the will as a faculty.  
The old word „will‟ now serves only to denote a resultant, a kind of individual reaction, 
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which follows necessarily upon a number of partly contradictory, partly harmonious stimuli:  
the will no longer „acts‟ or „moves‟.   (A 14) 
Denial of the causality of what we experience as “the will” is central to Nietzsche‟s skepticism 
about free will and moral responsibility.  If the faculty of the will “no longer „acts‟ or „moves‟” 
(A 14)—if it is no longer causal—then there remains no conceptual space for even the 
compatabilist idea that the right kind of causal determination of the will is compatible with 
responsibility for our actions.  (There is also no need for the idea of “unfree will”:  since the will 
is epiphenomenal, its freedom or causal determination is irrelevant.)  If, as Zarathustra puts it, 
“thought is one thing, the deed is another, and the image of the deed still another:  the wheel of 
causality does not roll between them” (Z I, “On the Pale Criminal”; cf D 124 for the same point), 
then there is no room for moral responsibility:  I may well identify with my “thoughts” or my 
will, but if they do not cause my actions, how could I possibly be responsible for them? 
 In the central discussion of free will and responsibility in the Genealogy, Nietzsche 
writes: 
For just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as a 
doing, as an effect of a subject called lightening, so popular morality also separates strength 
from the expressions of strength as if there were behind the strong an indifferent substratum 
that is free to express strength—or not to.  But there is no such substratum….[T]he 
suppressed, hiddenly glowing affects of revenge and hate exploit this belief [in the subject] 
and basically even uphold no other belief more ardently than this one, that the strong is free 
to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb:--they thereby gain for themselves the right to 
hold the bird of prey accountable (GM I:13) 
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The “will” that was denied as a faculty in the other passages is now here dubbed a “substratum” 
that stands behind the act and chooses to perform it, or not.   But there is no such faculty 
choosing to manifest strength or weakness:  there just is the doing, no doer who bears the 
responsibility for it.  The discussion of “The Four Great Errors” in The Twilight of the Idols is to 
the same effect.  As he concludes there, 
Today we no longer have any pity for the concept of „free will‟:  we know only too well 
what it really is—the foulest of all theologians‟ artifices, aimed at making mankind 
“responsible” in their sense….[T]he doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the 
purpose of punishment, that is, because one wanted to impute guilt. (7) 
Once again, denial that the will is a causal faculty is juxtaposed with a psychological explanation 
for why people would nonetheless be motivated to believe in freedom and responsibility.   Once 
we abandon this “error of free will,” in turn, we should abandon the reactive concepts whose 
intelligibility depends on it, concepts like “guilt.”  Zarathustra well describes the required 
revision to our thinking about freedom and responsibility that results:  “‟Enemy‟ you shall say, 
but not „villain‟; „sick‟ you shall say, but not „scoundrel‟; „fool‟ you shall say, but not „sinner‟” 
(Z I:  “On the Pale Criminal”).  The abandoned concepts—that of villain, scoundrel, and 
sinner—are all ones that require freedom and responsibility that would license blame, while the 
substitute concepts (enemy, sick, and fool) merely describe a person‟s condition or status, 
without supposing anything about the agent‟s responsibility for being in that condition. 
Against the Causality of the Will 
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 Nietzsche offers two arguments against the causality of the will—or, more precisely, against the 
causal efficacy of what we experience as willing.  We may call one the Phenomenology of Thoughts 
argument, the other the Doctrine of Types argument (cf. Leiter 2007). 
Nietzsche observes that “the feeling of will suffices for” a person “to assume cause and effect” 
(GS 127), but  Nietzsche claims that this feeling misleads us:  the phenomenology of “willing” an action, 
the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will (to say “I 
will”), is not causally connected to the resulting action in a way that would underwrite ascriptions of 
moral responsibility.  His central account (BGE 19) breaks the experience of willing into three 
components:   the feelings or experiences associated with bodily movement (hereafter “the bodily 
qualia”); the “commandeering thought” whose propositional content (and temporal priority) seems to 
connect it with the bodily movements; and the meta-feeling of power or pleasure that emerges from 
conscious identification with the commandeering thought (which explains why we identify with the 
thought, rather than with the bodily movement).   We feel as though we are exercising free will when 
we identify with the commandeering thought (e.g., “I want to get up”)  which we feel is superior to, and 
being obeyed by, the bodily qualia (the feelings of the body moving as we get up); and we so identify 
because of the feelings of pleasure and power that arise from what Nietzsche calls the “affect of 
superiority” that flows from that identification.  That this experience is misleading as to the causation of 
action—at least if that causation is to underwrite moral responsibility—follows from another bit of 
phenomenology, namely that, “a thought comes when ‘it’ wants, and not when ‘I’ want” (BGE 17).  From 
the fact that there is thinking, it does not follow that I, i.e., some subject or agent, is doing the thinking, 
and so it does not follow that I exist.  Although the explicit target in this particular passage is the 
Cartesian “I,” the surrounding context makes clear the real target, namely, the will.   
What does it mean to say a thought comes when “it” wants, not when “I” want?  Nietzsche’s 
point is that our “thoughts” appear in consciousness, without our having willed them.  Of course, 
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Nietzsche is engaged in an attack on the existence of will, so he can’t believe that there is any sense in 
which I could genuinely will a thought into existence.  Yet he cannot presuppose that conclusion here 
without begging the question.  Thus, we must take the talk of willing here to refer to the experience of 
willing, which Nietzsche concedes is real enough.   
 Nietzsche’s phenomenological point then comes to this:  a “thought” that appears in 
consciousness is not preceded by the phenomenology of willing that Nietzsche has described, that is, 
there is no “commandeering thought” preceding the conscious thought to which the meta-feeling (the 
affect of superiority) attaches.  (Even if there were such a commandeering thought in some instance, 
this would just create a regress, since not every commandeering thought will be preceded by the 
experience of willing.)  Since we do not experience our thoughts as willed the way we experience some 
actions as willed, it follows that no thought comes when “I will it” because the experience to which the 
“I will” attaches is absent.   
 Nietzsche cleverly points out that the criterion of willing that agents themselves treat as reliable 
guides to a causal relationship—namely, the phenomenology described above—is, in fact, completely 
absent in the case of thoughts (or, at least, in the case of the thought that starts an inferential chain of 
thinking which involves the experience of willing).  As an introspective matter, it seems Nietzsche is 
plainly correct about this point.  But if we do not experience our thoughts as willed, then it follows that 
the actions that follow upon our experience of willing (which includes those thoughts) are not caused in 
a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility, unless Nietzsche were a 
compatibilist—which, we have already seen, he is not. 
 The Phenomenology of Thoughts argument is not, however, the only consideration influencing 
Nietzsche’s skepticism about free will and moral responsibility.   Influenced, in part, by Schopenhauer’s 
views about the immutability of character and developments in nineteenth-century physiology, 
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especially as popularized by the so-called “German Materialists” of the 1850s and 60s, Nietzsche holds 
that persons are constituted by certain largely immutable psychological and physiological characteristics 
(call them “type-facts”) that play a decisive role in explaining much of their behavior and their moral 
beliefs.  Thus, Nietzsche accepts what we may call a “Doctrine of Types” (Leiter 1998), according to 
which, 
 
Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of 
person. 
Thus, Nietzsche claims, the “morality” that a philosopher embraces simply bears “decisive witness to 
who he is,”  that is, to the “innermost drives of his nature” (BGE 6).  He explains that “*M+oralities 
are…merely a sign language of the affects” (BGE 187), and observes elsewhere that,  “Answers to the 
questions about the value of existence…may always be considered first of all as the symptoms of certain 
bodies” (GS P:2).   “*O+ur moral judgments and evaluations…are only images and fantasies based on a 
physiological process unknown to us” (D 119), so that “it is always necessary to draw forth…the 
physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices” (D 542). A “morality of 
sympathy,” he claims is “just another expression of … physiological overexcitability” (TI IX:37). Nietzsche 
sums up the idea well in the preface to the Genealogy: “our thoughts, values, every ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ ‘if’ and 
‘but’ grow from us with the same inevitability as fruits borne on the tree — all related and each with an 
affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one earth, one sun” (GM Pref:2). 
 The Doctrine of Types is central to Nietzsche’s second argument against the causality of the will 
in “The Four Great Errors” chapter of Twilight of the Idols.  The first error  “of confusing cause and 
effect,” can be summarized as follows:  given two regularly correlated effects E1 and E2 and their 
mutual “deep cause,” we confuse cause and effect when we construe E1 as the cause of E2, missing 




Everybody knows the book of the famous Cornaro in which he recommends his slender 
diet as a recipe for a long and happy life...The worthy Italian thought his diet was the 
cause of his long life, whereas the precondition for a long life, the extraordinary 
slowness of his metabolism, the consumption of so little, was the cause of his slender 
diet.  He was not free to eat little or much; his frugality was not a matter of “free will”:  
he became sick when he ate more.  (TI VI:  1) 
What explains Cornaro’s slender diet and his long life is the same underlying fact about his metabolism.  
Cornaro’s mistake was to prescribe his diet for all without regard for how individuals differed 
metabolically, metabolism being the relevant type-fact in this context. 
Nietzsche saddles morality and religion quite generally with Cornarism.  According to Nietzsche, the 
basic “formula on which every religion and morality is founded is:  ‘Do this and that, refrain from that 
and that—then you will be happy!  Otherwise....”  Cornaro recommended a slender diet for a long life; 
morality and religion prescribe and proscribe certain conduct for a happy life.  But, says Nietzsche, 
[A] well-turned out human being...must perform certain actions and shrinks instinctively from 
other actions; he carries the order, which he represents physiologically, into his relations with 
other human beings and things. 
So morality and religion are guilty of Cornarism:  the conduct they prescribe and proscribe in order to 
cause a “happy life” are, in fact, effects of something else, namely the physiological order represented 
by a particular agent, one who (as Nietzsche says) “must perform certain actions,” just as Cornaro must 
eat a slender diet (he is “not free to eat little or much”).  That one performs certain actions and that one 
has a happy life are themselves both effects of the physiological order—conclusions that follow if we 
grant Nietzsche the Doctrine of Types. 
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 That brings us to the next central “error,” that of “false causality,” the mistake of thinking we 
know what causation is because of our introspective confidence in what we take to be the causal 
powers of our own mental life.  Nietzsche explains: 
We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing…Nor did one doubt that all the 
antecedents of an act, its causes, were to be sought in consciousness and would be 
found there once sought—as “motives”:  else one would not have been free and 
responsible for it.  Finally, who would have denied that a thought is caused?  That the 
“I” causes the thought?  (TI VI:3) 
The Phenomenology of Thoughts argument licenses precisely such a denial, and Nietzsche soon makes 
clear that his view remains unchanged: 
The "inner world" is full of phantoms...:  the will is one of them.  The will no longer moves 
anything, hence does not explain anything either--it merely accompanies events; it can also be 
absent.  The so-called motive:  another error.  Merely a surface phenomenon of 
consciousness--something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents 
of the deeds than to represent them.....What follows from this?  There are no [conscious] 
mental causes at all.  (TI VI:3) 
Skepticism about the causal efficacy of conscious motives is a recurring theme.  As he writes in 
Daybreak, "we are accustomed to exclude all [the] unconscious [unbewusst] processes from the 
accounting and to reflect on the preparation for an act only to the extent that it is conscious" (D 129), a 
view which Nietzsche deems mistaken.  Indeed, the theme of the "ridiculous overestimation and 
misunderstanding of consciousness" (GS 11) is a recurring one:  "[B]y far the greatest part of our spirit's 
activity," says Nietzsche, "remains unconscious and unfelt" (GS 333).  To be sure, there is a somewhat 
suspect overreaching in these passages:  are we to believe that no conscious belief is part of the causal 
explanation of any action?   Nietzsche does not need to defend this radical thesis, for what he is 
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interested in debunking is the causal nexus between the conscious experience of will and actions of 
moral significance, that is, the actions for which moral praise and blame might be ascribed.   
  If morally significant actions and the conscious mental states that precede them are themselves 
the product of type-facts (per the Doctrine of Types), then it follows that the conscious mental states 
that precede the action and whose propositional contents would make them appear to be causally 
connected to the action are, in fact, epiphenomenal, either as tokens or as types:  that is, they are either 
causally inert with respect to the action or causally effective only in virtue of other type-facts about the 
person. 
 How does it follow from these errors about causation that “free will” is also an error?  The error 
of confusing cause and effect is a general error that afflicts morality because morality is based on a 
mistaken picture of agency:  we think that certain moral prescriptions will bring about certain 
consequences for those who follow them, yet the ability and disposition to act on the prescriptions, and 
the enjoyment of the consequences are possible only for certain types of persons.  An exercise of free 
will plays no role.   
The error of false causality is an error because we wrongly infer that we know what causation is 
from our experience of the will being causal; but the will is not, in fact, causal, which follows from the 
Doctrine of Types.  But, on any account of free will and moral responsibility, the will must be causal 
(even if not causa sui), in order for agents to have free will and be morally responsible for their actions.  
Therefore, if the error of false causality is a genuine error, then it follows that there is no free will.  Only 
this second error implicates the phenomenology of willing, since it claims that we are in error in thinking 
we know what causation is based on our experience of the will.  And the argument says we are in error 
here because our experience of the will misleads us as to the causal powers of the will:  “there are no 
mental causes at all.” 
The Genesis of Action 
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 If the experience of willing does not, according to Nietzsche, illuminate how actions are brought 
about, what, then, really explains our actions?   Nietzsche’s account has a startling resonance with 
recent work in empirical psychology.  Daniel Wegner (2002), for example, wants to establish Nietzsche’s 
claim, namely, that the phenomenology of willing systematically misleads us as to the causation of our 
actions, drawing in part on Libet’s work on the brain electrical activity preceding the experience of 
willing (Wegn34 2002:  50-55).  And in the place of the “illusion of conscious will” as Wegner calls it, he 
proposes a different model according to which the experience of willing and action are products of 
unconscious causes, yet the chain of causation does not run between the experience of willing and the 
action; rather, in Nietzschean terms, some type-fact about persons explains both the experience and the 
action (Wegner 2002:  68, 98).    
 This whole discussion resonates with Nietzsche’s detailed remarks in his famed discussion of 
“self-mastery” (D 109).   Nietzsche is here concerned to answer the question as to the "ultimate motive" 
for "self-mastery."  He explains it as follows: 
[T]hat one wants to combat the vehemence of a drive at all…does not stand within our own 
power; nor does the choice of any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this 
method.  What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind 
instrument of another drive, which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting 
us.....While "we" believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is 
one drive which is complaining about the other; that is to say:  for us to become aware that we 
are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally 
vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our 
intellect is going to have to take sides. 
 
Although the intellect can “take sides" (Partei nehmen) this does not mean that the intellect determines 
which side prevails:  to the contrary, the intellect is a mere spectator upon the struggle.  Thus, the fact 
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that one masters oneself is not a product of “free will,” but rather an effect of the underlying type-facts 
characteristic of that person:  namely, which of his various drives happens to be strongest.  There is, as it 
were, no  no conscious "self" who contributes anything to “self-master,” which is merely an effect of the 
interplay of certain unconscious drives, drives over which the conscious self exercises no control.  A 
"person" is an arena in which the struggle of drives (type - facts) is played out; how they play out 
determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes.  But, qua conscious self or "agent", the 
person takes no active part in the process.  As Nietzsche puts it elsewhere:  “The will to overcome an 
affect is, in the end, itself only the will of another, or several other, affects” (BGE 117).  The will, in other 
words, or the experience of willing (in self-mastery), is itself the product of various unconscious drives or 
affects.   
A “Persuasive (Re)Definition” of Free Will 
 Recent commentators (e.g., Gemes 2009 and Poellner 2009) have been impressed by 
Nietzsche’s occasional positive use of the language of “freedom” and “free will.”  Nietzsche’s usages, 
however, are naturally assimilated to what Stevenson (1938) dubbed “persuasive definitions”:  attempts 
to revise the meaning of a term to which a positive valence already attaches.   The passages at issue are 
few and far between (cf. GS 347; GM II:2; GM III:10; TI IX:38), some are ironic (e.g.,  
the slightly ludicrous figure of the souverain Individuum of GM II:2—who never appears again in the 
corpus—is described as the product of good animal breeding who is “free” (in quotes) because he can 
make promises and remember that he made them!), and some present, as Poellner puts it, a 
“substantive ideal” of the self (2009:  152) unconnected to any recognizable philosophical claim about 
freedom.  Nietzsche certainly celebrates the “higher type” of person who has a certain pattern of 
coherent drives, but this is a fortuitous natural fact about certain persons, not an achievement of 
autonomous agency.    
Typical of Nietzche’s persuasive definitions of freedom is this passage: 
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[W]ar educates for freedom.  For what is freedom?  That one has the will to assume responsibility 
for oneself.  That one maintains the distance which separates us.  That one becomes more 
indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself.  That one is prepared to sacrifice 
human beings for one’s cause, not excluding oneself.  Freedom means that the manly instincts 
which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for example, over those of 
‘happiness.’  The human being who has become free—and much more the spirit who has become 
free—spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, 
females, Englishmen, and other democrats.  The free man is a warrior.  
This bracing statement of a “noble” ideal of the person equally plainly has nothing to do with any notion 
of freedom, free will, or moral responsibility that has engaged any philosopher in the entire tradition of 
Western philosophy.   That should not surprise, since Nietzsche’s aims are polemical and rhetorical:  a 
persuasive definition of a concept like freedom, which enjoys such authority in Western culture, is one 
way to cause an affective response in some readers, which might lead to a transformation of their 
consciousness.  But such a transformation is, itself, a causal process in which free choice is irrelevant, 
but evaluative, i.e., emotional, excitation is key (Leiter 2002:  91-101, 157-158).    
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